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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

The
first

sole issue for determination by the Court is an issue of
impression

in

the State of Utah:

whether a

bank

which

responds to an inquiry regarding the status of an account

owes a

duty to the inquirer to respond accurately where reliance on the
response is reasonably foreseeable?

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. BACKGROUND
In October of 1981, Bales Construction Company, a Utah corporation

("Bales") purchased,

("Basin State"),
State of Utah.
Amiron

with a loan from Basin State

Bank

certain real property located in Uintah County,
Within a month, Bales and its companion company,

Development

Company

("Amiron")

obtained

a

loan for

$2,300,000.00 from a consortium of out-of-state banks to develop
a condominium project on the site in Vernal, Utah known as Ashley
Park.
Acting as the disbursing and servicing agent for the project
for

the

requests

funding

banks,

Basin State was to "receive

from the contractor;

the draw

prepare the construction

inspect the project or see that the project was

drafts;

inspected;

out

a participation certificate to send to the lenders;

the

requested funds from the lenders;

struction

and to release

make

receive

the con-

drafts to the contractor." (Deposition of Dan Turner,

4

p.

26, lines 17-23)

In addition, pursuant to their Construction

Agreement, Basin State was to make draws based upon the "itemization of expenditures to date .
and

.

. of all items due and unpaid,

all items necessary for completion,

completion

showing the percent

of each of the buildings and improvements under

struction to such date."

(Affidavit of Mike Rasmussenf

of

con-

pp. 4-5,

para. 13).
In

February of 1982f

the developers had to modify the pro-

ject to meet flood plain requirements, which increased the
of

the project,

cost

but such information was never conveyed to

the

lenders by Basin State as Basin State was originally requested by
the Developers.
15).

Basin

(Affidavit of Kevin Bales,

State

also

pp.

failed to track the

3-4, para. 13-

exact

percentage

completion of the project or the amount of funds remaining in the
account as required by their Construction Agreement.
of Dan Turner,
State

was

project

page 36,

less

lines 22 through 25).

than enthusiastic in their

(Memorandum

of

(Deposition

Finally,

inspection

Points and Authorities

in

Basin

of

Support

the
of

Objection to Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 3-4, para 13, 14).
In May of 1982,
a

lumber

requested
Being

products company located in the State of
to

prudent

contacted

the Plaintiff/Appellant ("Tree

Products"),
Oregon,

was

supply cedar siding to the

Ashley

Park

project.

with their extensions of

credit,

Tree

Products

the Basin State official in charge of

inspecting

the

project

and dispensing project funds

p.

lines 3-5) and inquired about both the current financial

27,

5

(Deposition of Dan Turner,

status of the project and the development history of the
(Affidavit of Donald Fraser,
concerned
worth

p. 2, para. 8).

project

Tree Products was

that it be assured of payment for the siding which was

approximately

$70,000, and looked

to the

officials

Basin State to accurately communicate to it the financial

of

health

of the Ashley Park project.
In spite of the
the

difficulties which loomed over the project,

credit manager of Basin State reported to Tree Products that

the project was "fully funded," "that the funds were in
and

escrow,"

that it could rely on Amiron and Bales to pay their

obliga-

tions. (Affidavit of Donald Fraser, p. 2). It is also the testimony of Donald Fraser, credit manager for Tree Products, that
In all my years of banking and credit experience,
the recommendation of Bales Credit by Basin State Bank
was as strong a recommendation as I had ever received
before.
I felt very good about the representation
made by Basin State Bank and felt that Tree Products
Company could justifiably rely thereon. (Affidavit of
Donald Fraser, p. 3).
Thus assured,
State's

credit

Tree Products took the representations of Basin
manager

at his word and

delivered

substantial

amounts of cedar siding to the Ashley Park Development.
After delivery of the product to the Ashley Park Project and
subsequent
between

tender of payment by Bales/Amiron,

Tree

Products

and Bales/Amiron

charged for the cedar siding.
the
July

dispute,

a

dispute

concerning

the

arose
price

Before making a decision regarding

Tree Products consulted

with Basin State again in

of 1982 respecting the financial status of the project
6

and

was informed again that the project was "fully funded," that
invoices
about

"would

be paid," and that "there was no need to

that account."

18).

Assured

by

Basin

Joseph Zabaldo at 5,
tiate

(Affidavit of Joseph Zabaldo at
State's representations

worry

4, para.

(Affidavit

the

of

para. 21), Tree Products continued to nego-

with the project managers and the officers of Basin

concerning

the

pricing differences,

State

but the negotiations

were

too late.
In
The

September of 1982,

the construction loan was

lending banks thereafter refused to extend the loan and

project was left uncompleted,
and

depleted.

Bales are insolvent.

worthless,
consortium,
project.

being
which

$250,000.00 over

budget.

the

Amiron

Tree Productfs materialman's lien

junior to the first mortgage held by the
mortgage

bank

equals or exceeds the value of

Tree Products has not been paid for its

is

siding,

the
and

there are no prospects for payment from the contractor.
B. STATUS OF LITIGATION
Litigation has ensued,
dents for fraud,
the

negligence, breach of contract, failure to meet

bonding statute,

acts,
causes

quantum meruit,

co-mingling of funds,
of

negligence

with Tree Products suing the Respon-

partnership,

ultra vires

and breach of fiduciary

duty.

All

action with the exception of the cause of action

for

were either dismissed by stipulation or by

Order

of

the Court.
Finally, the Defendant Basin State Bank brought a Motion for

7

Summary Judgment against the Appellant with respect to the Appellant's

eleventh

cause

of

action based on

negligence

on

the

grounds that:
1. No duty was owed by Basin State to Tree Products;
2.

Damages

Productfs

to

refusal

Tree Products

were caused

of the tendered checks and not

by

Tree

by

any

negligence of Basin State; and
3.

Any claims based upon misrepresentation regarding

credit are barred by Utah Code Section 25-5-5.
Tree

Products

then

brought

a

Cross-Motion

for

Summary

Judgment on the grounds of:
1.

Breach of duty to properly inspect the construction

2.

Breach of duty to monitor the construction loan;

progress;

3.

Breach

of

duty to prudently

disburse

the

loan

4.

Breach of duty to communicate accurate information

proceeds;

of the project to Tree Products; and
5.

Negligent

misrepresentation of the status of

the

project.
According
agreed
set
After

to the Ruling entered by the Court,

at the trial court level that the facts,

forth above in the Facts section,

supra,

the

parties

essentially

were

undisputed.

reviewing the facts of the case and the memorandum of

parties,

the

Seventh District Court,

the Honorable Richard

Davidson presiding, stated in his Ruling as follows:
8

as

the
C.

Plaintiff Tree Products alleges that Basin State Bank
had a duty to inspect the project, to supervise and manage
the loan and that such duty was owed to Tree Products.
However, the facts in this case show that the loan
agreement was entered into between Basin State Bank and
Amiron Development. Subsequently, the funds were disbursed
at the direction of Amiron.
While Tree Products may have
been an ultimate beneficiary of that agreement, no duty
exists on the part of the bank which is owed to them.[stet]
In addition, in carrying out its duty to Amiron, Basin
State did tender payment to Tree Products but due to
controversy with Amiron, Tree Products refused payment.
At the direction of Amiron, the money was utilized to pay
other bills.
The argument of Plaintiff Tree Products would place the
bank in the position of owing conflicting duties and of
owing duties not contemplated in the making of
the
construction loan.
The bank would be set up in the
position of project overseer and manager not only of the
construction funding but also of the actual construction.
This is not such a duty as any bank would contract for and
is not what was done here.
It

is

from the final ruling of Judge

Products appeals,
took

the

mers,

contending in its appeal that,

an

inquirer

that

Basin

State

does indeed have a duty

account

to

and

regarding the status
that

will rely upon such statements to determine the

9

custo-

correctly

when it can be reasonably anticipated

of its future business dealings.

Tree

once it under-

dispensing of credit information regarding its

accurately report to any inquirer the facts
of

Davidson

the

course

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Clear

precedent

from this and other

jurisdictions

estab-

lishes that when an entity, such as the bank in this case, undertakes

to

provide information regarding the credit status

customer,
tion.

it

The

of

a

has a duty of due care in dispensing such informa-

multiple

factor analysis adopted by this

Court

in

Christenson vs.

Commonwealth Land Title, infra, establishes that

Appellee

State

Basin

breached that duty.

Bank both had a

duty

to

Appellant

and

Basin State had a pecuniary interest in the

affairs of its customer regarding whom Appellant inquired, was in
a superior position to have knowledge regarding its customer, was
negligent
knew

or

in providing information regarding its
should

information.
mation

was

have known that Appellant would

customer,
rely

on

and
such

Plaintiffs resulting reliance on Appelleefs inforreasonable

and resulted in

substantial

damage

to

Appellant1s interests.
Basin State should not be permitted to escape its obligation
of

due

frauds,
State
Frauds
fense.

care because of the provisions of the

Utah

otherwise known as Lord Tenderton's act.

statute

First, Basin

failed to plead the affirmative defense of the Statute
in

of

its answer and is now precluded from raising the

of
de-

Second, the provision, as authoritatively interpreted by

the English House of Lords, was originally designed to prevent a
litigant from "pleading around" the statute of frauds as
not

it

was

designed to permit a defendant from escaping its obligations

under the "reasonableness" standard applied in negligence cases.
10

ARGUMENT
A.
OTHERS
CAN

A BANK HAS THE DUTY TO CAREFULLY RESPOND TO INQUIRIES OF
CONCERNING THE STATUS OF A CUSTOMER OR AN ACCOUNT WHEN IT

BE REASONABLY ANTICIPATED THAT THE INQUIRER WILL

REASONABLY

RELY ON THE REPRESENTATIONS OF THE BANK
This case presents a narrow legal issue:
the

whether a bank has

duty to carefully respond to inquiries of others

concerning

the status of a customer or an account when it can be

reasonably

anticipated

that the inquirer will reasonably rely on the repre-

sentations of the bank.

Logic and clear precedent from Utah and

other jurisdictions suggest only one answer:

appellee bank had a

duty to appellant that was breached in the circumstances of
case.

this

The trial court accordingly erred when it dismissed appel-

lant's claim.
i.

Cases from this and other jurisdictions establish a

duty on the part of the appellee bank.
One
a

of the most eloquent legal opinions

discussing whether

cause of action exists for negligent misrepresentation is

English

case

of

Hedley Byrne & Co., Ltd. v. Heller & Partners,

[1963] 2 All E.R.
Lords

in 1963,

583.

The matter, brought before the House of

involved a bank which inquired of

concerning the financial position of a customer.
"in

confidence

responding

the

another

The inquiry was

and without responsibility" on the part

bank,

which

replied

11

bank

that the customer was

of
a

the
good

customer and trustworthy.
to

the customer,

The inquiring bank then granted a loan

the customer promptly

money was lost and never repaid,

became

insolvent,

the

and the inquiring bank sued the

responding bank for negligence.
The
in
the

defense to the action was that no cause of action arose

negligence because there was no affirmative duty of
part

of the responding bank to the

inquiring

care

bank.

on
The

Lords quickly dissected the issue per Lord Hale:
A reasonable man, knowing that he was being trusted or
that his skill and judgment were being relied on, I
think, has three courses open to him. He could keep
silent or decline to give the information or advice
sought: or he could give an answer with a clear qualification that he accepted no responsibility for it or
that it was given without that reflection or inquiry
which a careful answer would require: or he could
simply answer without any qualification. If he chooses
to adopt the last course he must, I think, be held to
have accepted some responsibility for his answer being
given carefully, or to have accepted a relationship
with the inquirer which requires him to exercise such
care as the circumstances require, ^d. at 583.
The

Lords ruled that if a bank elected the third course of

action, the first part of a cause of action founded in negligence
would be established,
inquiring

bank.

i.e., a duty by the responding bank to the

(See footnotes 1 and 2).

Upon establishing

a

"1.
See also the statements of Lord Morris:
[I]t should
now be regarded as settled that if someone possessed of a special
skill undertakes, quite irrespective of contract, to apply that
skill for the assistance of another person who relies on such
skill, a duty of care will arise. J^d. at 594. and
"2. See statement of Lord Hodson: [I]f in a sphere where a
person is so placed that others could reasonably rely on his
judgment or his skill or on his ability to make careful inquiry
such person takes it on himself to give information or advice to,
or allows his information or advice to be passed on to, another
person who, as he knows, or should know, will place reliance on
it, then a duty of care will arise. Id. at 601.
12

duty

recovery would be permitted,

plaintiff

established

the Lords concluded,

"that the bank failed to

if

discharge

the
such

and that as a consequence [plaintiff] suffered loss.11

duty,
587.

In

arose

Hedley,

the Lords concluded that no cause of

Ld.

action

because the limitation "without responsibility" that

pre-

ceded the responding bank's advice relieved the bank of a duty of
care.
This matter,
the

unlike Hedley, does not founder at the outset;

appellee's advice to appellant was given without

tion.

Accordingly,

here.

When

account

or

the

qualifica-

reasoning of Hedley supports

a bank possesses superior knowledge

recovery

regarding

credit history or financial dealings of a

the

customer,

and a party (such as appellant here) inquires about the financial
health of the customer,
tion,

the

receiving a response without

qualifica-

bank is under an affirmative duty to respond

accur-

ately and with care.
The English precedent set out above is no anomaly.
recognized
since
373

a

cause of action for

at least 1962.
P.2d

382

negligent

misrepresentation

The case of Ellis v. Hale 13 Utah 2d 279,

(1962) appears to be the first case

in

address the issue whether a cause of action exists for
misrepresentation.

Utah has

There,

the

Utah

to

negligent

court concluded that a cause of

action

for negligent misrepresentation could be

"there

is a special duty of care running from the representor to

the representee." Id., at 385.

13

established

if

at

In

Jardine v. Brunswick Corporation,

18 Utah 2d

378, 423

P.2d 659 (1967), this Court further elaborated the elements of an
action for negligent misrepresentation.
anticipated

building

a

bowling alley using

manufactured by the Defendant.
asked

Defendant

In

Brunswick

Jardine,

plaintiff

bowling

equipment

Before building, Plaintiff Jardine

its

advice

concerning

the

credit

worthiness of a certain contractor, and Brunswick replied that it
was

good but

upon

that plaintiff should

Brunswick's

$32,000.00.

assurances,

the

merits

negligent

himself.

Jardine advanced

the

Based

contractor

True to course, the contractor failed to perform and

Jardine lost his money.
on

"protect"

Jardine then sued Brunswick,

in the District Court (which held

misrepresentation), and

prevailed

there

was

faced Brunswickfs appeal

a
to

this Court.
This Court held that
under some circumstances there may be a cause of action for
deceit even though the misrepresentation was not wilfully
false.
[citing Ellis v. Hale, supra] Where one having a
pecuniary interest in a transaction, is in a superior
position to know material facts, and carelessly or negligently makes a false representation concerning them, expecting the other party to rely and act thereon, and the
other party reasonably does so and suffers loss in that
transaction, the representor can be held responsible . . .
Id. at 661-662.
The

Court

thus set forth three elements in

the

expanding

standard for negligent misrepresentation, i.e., (1) the necessity
of

a

pecuniary interest;

(2)

the "superior position

14

to

know

material

facts" of the negligent party;

and (3) reasonable

and

known reliance by the inquirer.
In Jardine,
had

a

the Supreme Court decided that while

pecuniary interest,

material facts,
sentations,
case

and

"protect"

was in a superior position to

and knew that Jardine was relying on his

there
Jardine

had

himself.

not taken the advice

In other words,

advice

with a "clear qualification." See
not

repre-

See Hedley,

the

Brunswick

to

elected

the

giving

its

supra,

Hedley,

supra.

the necessary element of reasonable

Jardine on all the advice
It

of

Brunswick had

of Lord Hales1 options

was

know

was a contributory negligence defense in

second

thus

Brunswick

There

reliance

by

of Brunswick.

was not until 1983 that the Utah Supreme Court was

pre-

sented with another case grounded in negligent misrepresentation.
In
the

Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title,
Plaintiff

company,
ledged

finally prevailed.

Commonwealth

666 P.2d 302

The case,

(1983)

involved a

Land Title, who had negligently

title

acknow-

an incorrect document indicating certain properties

were

unencumbered, while in fact the properties were encumbered.
Commonwealth
company

known

was

as AGLA.

the escrow agent for a
AGLA conveyed title

estate lots to Commonwealth as trustee,
the

land
to

celed out the monies to appropriate parties.

estate

of a savings and loan,
development,

certain

real

and when a lot was sold,

proceeds were paid in full to Commonwealth,

trustee

development

which then par-

The Plaintiff, as a

loaned money to AGLA on

a

real

which did not produce enough revenue to pay
15

back the Plaintiff's loan.
gation,

AGLA

assigned

Commonwealth

a number of lots

beneficially

held

to the Plaintiff as payment for the remaining

tion of the loan.
sent

Therefore, to satisfy the loan obli-

por-

At the request of the Plaintiff, Commonwealth

to the Plaintiff a description of the lots assigned to

Plaintiff,
paid

which

the

list erroneoulsy included five lots previously

off and owned by third parties.

cepted

by

as partial payment,

Thus,

Plaintiff had

on the negligent advice

of

ac-

Common-

wealth, title to five lots which it did not and could not own.
Plaintiff sued,

alleging negligent misrepresentation on the

part of Commonwealth. The District Court granted judgment for the
Plaintiff,

and

this Court affirmed on the ground that negligent

misrepresentations

were made to the

Plaintiff.

This

Court

quoted Jardine with approval and stated:
As the definition [from Jardine] suggests, a casual
statement or gratuitous advice from a stranger to a transaction cannot be the grounds for negligent misrepresentation. The recipient of such information could not reasonably rely on it because he could hardly expect the representor to exercise prudence and care in making the statement that could warrant reliance. IcJ. at 305.
Thus,

if

the advice comes from a stranger with no

special

relationship wherein one is expected to rely on the statements of
the

other,

comes

then

But if the

from someone who is trained in the business

information,
plies.

no special duty attaches.

and does supply information,

of

advice

supplying

a higher standard ap-

As the Court concluded:
If .

.

. the information is given in the capacity of one
16

in the business of supplying such information,

that

care

and diligence should be exercised which is compatible with
the particular business or profession involved.
Those who
deal with such persons do so because the of advantages
which they expect to derive from this special competence.
The law, therefore, may well predicate on such a relationship, the duty of care to insure the accuracy and validity
of the information, ^d. at 305 citing from 1 F. Harper &
F. James, Section 7.6 at 546. (See footnote 3 ) .
In analyzing Commonwealth's claim,

the Court enumerated:

(1) Commonwealth did have a pecuniary interest,
was

for it

paid to be the escrow agent and to disburse the proceeds

of

lot sales to AGLA and its assigns;
(2)

Commonwealth

was in a superior position

to

have

knowledge about the status of the lots;
(3) because Commonwealth was in a superior position to
know
ledge

of the status of the lots,
as it should have,

and did not utilize that

Commonwealth was negligent in

knowsigning

the acknowledgements;
(4)

Commonwealth knew that the Plaintiff would rely on

the representations of Commonwealth;
(5)

"3.

Plaintiff's reliance on the information of Common-

Harper & James took their conclusion from several New
York cases which unequivocably hold that if the information
is received from one in a peculiar position to supply the
information, the information must be accurate or an action
in negligent misrepresentation will lie. See, e.g. Glanxer
v^ Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275, 23 A.L.R. 1425
(1923); Doyle y^ Chatham Bank, 253 N.Y. 369, 171 N.E. 574
(1930); Mulroy v. Wright, 185 Mich. 84, 240 N.W. 116
(1932) .

17

wealth was reasonable; and
(6) the reliance on negligently given false information
led to a loss by the Plaintiff.
The

Court found that

"a duty arose to use reasonable

care

to not mislead one whom Commonwealth knew would justifiably

rely

upon the facts as represented." Ld. at 306.
jurisdictions

have

reached

identical analysis.

In

0'Mailey Lumber Co.,
title

insurance

Cases from other

similar conclusions with

14 Ariz.App.

company

486,

484 P.2d 639 (1971)

was employed as an escrow agent

Several contractors contacted Arizona Title for

tractors to be paid,

lied

were

When the money ran

a

out

all paid the Arizona court held

was guilty of negligent misrepresentation.
on

number of

con-

and Arizona Title regularly but negligently

such assurances.

contractors
Title

As part of

that there were sufficient escrow funds for the

out

a

it informed the various contractors of the progress

of the project.

gave

by

a

The duty of the title company was to

disburse funds to contractors working on the project.

assurances

nearly

Arizona Title Insurance and Trust Co. v.

large construction project.

its actions,

a

authorities

on

the

before

that

the

Arizona

The court re-

subject,

including

Prosser,

Handbook of the Law of Torts Section 102 at 719 et seq.

(3rd ed.

1964),

Torts.

Harper and James, supra, and the Restatement of

(See footnote 4).

"4.
As does Hedley, supra, the Restatement succinctly
defines negligent misrepresentation as follows:
Section 552. Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others.
18

One

who in the course of his business or profession

supplies

The Court strongly concluded that, in Arizona, at least,
Arizona Title owed no contractual or trust duty to the
contractors, and . . . apart from any representations
made by Arizona Title to the contractors concerning
the availability of funds, it did not owe the contractors the duty to make any calculations to ascertain
whether sufficient funds would or would not be available to pay the contractors for their work.
In other
words, Arizona Title had no duty to speak or respond
to the contractors1 inquiries at all. But if it chose
to speak, we think that under all of the circumstances
its business relationship with the contractors carried
with it a duty to exercise reasonable care in making
representations about presently ascertainable facts.
Id. at 492, 484 P.2d at 645. (emphasis in original).
(See footnote 5)
The

Nevada Supreme Court has also rendered a decision

ectly applicable in to the matter at

bar.

Nevada National Bank

v. Gold Star Meat Company 514 P.2d 651 (1973) is a case in
the

Gold

Holiday

Star

Meat Company was presented with

Ranch whose parent company had an account

National Bank.

dir-

an

order

which
from

at the Nevada

Gold Star contacted Nevada National and inquired

about the credit of Holiday Ranch, and Nevada National stated the
"4 (cont.) information for the guidance of others in their
business transactions is subject to liability for harm caused to
them by their reliance upon the information if
(a) he fails to exercise that care and competence in
obtaining and communicating the information which its recipient
is justified in expecting, and
(b) the harm is suffered
(i) by the person or one of the class of persons for
whose guidance the inforation was supplied, and
(ii) because of his justifiable reliance upon it in a
transaction in which it was in-tended to influence his conduct or
in a transaction substantially identical therewith.
"5.
The above quotation from the Arizona Court, was quoted
verbatim by the Christenson v. Commonwealth court, and by reference, made a part of the law of Utah.
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credit was sufficient,

even though Holiday Ranch had no

account

at the time with the bank.
Gold Star extended credit,

Holiday Ranch failed to pay, and

suit

was filed against the bank for negligent misrepresentation.

Gold

Star prevailed in the district court,

appealed.

and Nevada

National

The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed, stating

[W]here a bank office through its officer undertakes
to give advice, even gratuitously, that officer is
bound to use the skill and expertise which he has or
which he
could be presumed to have.
When that
officer
negligently
or carelessly
attempts
to
discharge that duty by misrepresenting facts within
his knowledge, the bank should be held responsible for
those misrepresentations, ^d at 653-654.
That the bank officer had no duty to respond the inquiry was
acknowledged

by the Court,

such a course of action,
due care." I_d.

but once he "voluntarily ventured on

he was thenceforth required to exercise

at 654. And such duty of care must be carried out

with accuracy and "full candor"

(_Id) . at 654 for "it was

able

that after a specific inquiry about the credit of a

tial

customer and a favorable disclosure by the [bank],

forsee-

potenthat an

ordinary, prudent person would extend credit based on that favorable information." Id., at 654.
ii.
The

Appellee bank owed a duty of due care to appellant

above case law establishes that once an agent with

responsibility

to

disburse funds takes on the function

of

the
re-

porting the financial status of a project, that agent owes a duty
of due care to third parties to accurately report the true nature

20

of

the financial resources of the project.

Both the Christenson

v. Commonwealth Title and the Arizona Title cases are squarely in
support of the situation at hand, and the analysis of those cases
mandate reversal of the District Court for:
(1)
project

Basin State did have a pecuniary interest

in

the

it was the disbursing agent and was paid a

fee

Basin State did not have a duty to respond to

the

because

for such services;
(2)

inquiries of Tree Products concerning the financial health of the
project;
(3)
occassions,

but

Basin State did undertake,

on

two

separate

to answer the inquiries of Tree Products concerning

the ability of Amiron and Bales to pay their accounts;
(4) yet Basin State answered the inquiries negligently,
being

dilatory

accurate

in

in

its duties to inspect the

its analysis of the real financial

project
health

and

in-

of

the

project; (See footnote 6 ) .
(5)

Basin

State

was in a superior position

to

know

about the financial health of the project;
(6)

Basin State knew that Tree Products was using

the

information supplied to form an opinion concerning the advisibil

"6. In fact, in the deposition of Dan Turner, (who took over the
responsibilities of disbursement from the prior employee who had
also incorrectly indicated that the project was fully funded and
there would be no problems with payment), Mr. Turner admits that
he was not aware of the financial status of the project or percentage completion of the project or progress on the budget until
after the lenders refused a request for a draw in September.
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ity of extending credit to the project;
(7)
Basin

State

entity

Tree Product's reliance on the representations
was reasonable in light of the fact that

no

of

other

apparently had any better access to the records than

did

Basin State;
(8)

Tree Products did suffer damages from

relying

on

the

statements of Basin State that the project was fully funded,

for

Tree

July

Products would not have returned the payment

if

Tree

precarious
payment

Products

financial

was

had been

accurately

status of the

not a full payment.

project,
Therefore,

made

in

of

the

even

though

the

the

damages

are

informed

certain and capable of calculation.
Thus,

the finding of Judge Davidson in the lower court that

,f

the argument of Plaintiff Tree Products would place the bank

the

position of owing conflicting duties and of owing duties not

contemplated

in the making of the construction loan" is

only in the limited sense that the bank may not have

correct

consciously

contemplated

the duty of correctly reporting the current

cial

of the project to prospective contractors and

status

pliers

of

loan.

materials at the time it made

the

sup-

construction

the current financial status of the project,

the

bank

assumed the duty of accurately reporting the current finan-

cial status of the project.
in

the

finan-

But when the bank did take upon itself to report to Tree

Products
also

in

its

When a bank negligently

duty of accuracy as set forth above by this
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Court,

fails
the

bank becomes guilty of negligent misrepresentation;

accordingly,

Tree Products is entitled to its damages, as prayed in its Motion
for

Summary

Judgment,

suffered as a result

of

the

negligent

misrepresentations of appellee.
B.
OF

TREE

PRODUCTS DAMAGES WERE THE RESULT OF THE NEGLIGENCE

BASIN STATE IN REPORTING THE CURRENT FINANCIAL STATUS OF

PROJECT,
RENDER

WHICH NEGLIGENT REPORTING CAUSED TREE PRODUCTS TO

THE
SUR-

ITS PARTIAL PAYMENT FOR THE PROSPECT OF RECEIVING PAYMENT

IN FULL
As set forth in the affidavit of Joseph Zabaldo,
23,

Tree

disputing

Product's
the

amount

loss resulted not from
of

their

monies due and owing

for

p. 5 para.
actions
the

in

cedar

siding, but resulted from the negligent statements by Basin State
that

the

project

was "fully funded" and

that

payments

would

certainly be forthcoming.
C.
STATUTE

DEFENDANT FAILED TO RAISE THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF THE
OF FRAUDS (UTAH CODE SECTION 25-5-5) IN

PLEADINGS

ITS

RESPONSIVE

AND IS PROCEDURALLY BARRED FROM RAISING THE ISSUE AT A

LATER DATE
Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states:
(c) Affirmative Defenses.
In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set
forth affirmatively . . . statute of frauds . . . and any
other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative
defense. . . .
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Rule

12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is entitled

"Waiver of Defenses" and sets forth, in applicable part:
(h) Waiver of Defenses.
A party waives all defenses and objections which
he does not present either by motion as hereinabove
provided [Rule 12(b) motions, motion for judgment on
the pleadings, motion for more definite statement and
motion to strike] or, if he has made no motion, in
his answer or reply . . . .
The appellee failed to raise the affirmative defense of
statute

of frauds in either its answer or answer to the

complaint.
its

Nor

the

amended

did the appellee make at any a motion to

amend

answer to include the defense of the statute of frauds.

In

fact,

the first time the issue was raised appeared in the appel-

lee's

Motion

for Summary Judgment,

Rules of Civil Procedure,
infra,

the

supra,

and according to

the

and the Utah authority

Utah

cited,

Statute of Frauds affirmative defense must be raised

in the reply or answer.
One of the first Utah cases to address the issue of
the

affirmative

defense of the Statute of Frauds

is

raising

W.W.&W.B.

Gardner, Inc. v. Pappas 24 Utah 2d 264, 470 P.2d 252 (1970) which
states:
However, the basis upon which the instant appeal
should be resolved is that the Statute of Frauds was
not properly pleaded and therefore did not constitute
a defense.
[Defendant] filed an answer in which they
pleaded a general denial; they filed simultaneously a
separate motion to dismiss on the ground that the
plaintifffs claim was barred by the Statute of Frauds.
Rule 12(b), U.R.C.P., specifies the defenses which may
be asserted by motion, defendants1 ground is not
included therein.
Rule 8(c), U.R.C.P., provides that
the Statute of Frauds is an affirmative defense.
Defendants did not follow this procedure. Jj3. at 253.
24

In Staker v. Huntingon Cleveland Irrigation Company 664 P.2d
1188 (1983),
the trial,
ute

the defendant moved the trial court,

on the day of

to allow an amendment of its answer to assert a stat-

of limitations defense.

The trial court denied the motion,

and the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court.

In speaking to

the issue, this Court states,
The statute of limitations defense must be pleaded
as an affirmative defense in a responsive pleading, or
it is waived, Utah R.Civ.P. 8(c) and 12(h), unless an
amended pleading asserting the defense is allowed
pursuant to the requirements of Rule 15(a). Ld. at
1190.
Another 1983 case, Valley Bank and Trust Co. v.Wilken 668 P
2d.

493 (1983) applies very closely to the case at hand, for the

defendant/appellant failed to raise an affirmative defense in her
answer,
ment.

and raised the issue for the first time in summary judg-

The Court disapproved of the timing, and says:
The
appellant's sole contention is that the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment because
her husband's affidavit had raised the defense of
failure of consideration.
The difficulty with her
argument is that she was obligated to raise that
defense in her answer to the complaint. She made only
a general denial in her answer and did not raise any
affirmative defenses.
Failure of consideration is an
affirmative defense and must be pleaded as such. Rule
8(c), U.R.C.P.
She made no effort to move to amend
her answer under Rule 15 to raise that defense.
She
could not raise it by means of an affidavit in
opposition to summary judgment.
It is not the office
of an affidavit in opposition to a motion for summary
judgment to provide a means of introducing defenses
which have not been raised by the answer or by proper
motion. Rule 12 (b), U.R.C.P. . . . Since the defense
was not properly raised, she waived it. Ld. at 494.
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D.

IF

THE

COURT DOES NOT DISMISS THE STATUTE

ISSUE ON PROCEDURAL GROUNDS,
TO

BE

INAPPLICABLE

IN

OF

UTAH CODE SECTION 25-5-5

THIS MATTER AND IS NOT A

FRAUDS

CONTINUES

BAR

TO

THE

MISREPRESENTATIONS OF BASIN STATE
i.

The Statute

Utah Code Ann. 25-5-5 (1953) states:
To charge a person upon a representation as to the
credit of a third person, such representation, or
some memorandum thereof, must be in writing subscribed by the party to be charged therewith.
ii.
The
comes
of

above

Derivation of the Statute-Lord Tenterton's Act
statute,

referred to as Lord Tenterton's

directly from a 1828 English statute amending the

Frauds of 1677.

Act,

Statute

The content of Lord Tenterton's Act is

as

follows:
No action shall be brought whereby to charge any
person upon or by reason of any representation or
assurance made or given concerning or relating to the
character,
conduct,
credit, ability, trade, or
dealings of any other person, to the intent or
purposes that such other person may obtain credit,
money, or goods upon [it], unless such representation
or assurance be made in writing, signed by the party
to be charged therewith. [Section 6 of the Statute of
Frauds]
The

Act was enacted to close a perceived "loophole" in the

ginal Statute of Frauds.

ori-

As explained by the House of Lords

W.B. Anderson £ Sons v. Rhodes, 862 [1967] 2 All E.R.:
The law lords based their decision partly on the
history
of the section [Lord Tenterton's Act].
Because s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds (1677) made a
promise to answer for a debt, default or miscarriage
26

in

of another unenforceable unless in writing, a custom
grew up in the profession of alleging a fraudulent
representation as to credit in order in order to
circumvent
the
statute.
Apparently
juries,
displaying their traditional anxiety to find verdicts
in favour of plaintiffs, were easily induced to find
fraud where no real fraud existed.
To put an end to
this practice, Lord Tenderton introduced the bill
containing this section,
and it was passed by
Parliament. _Id. at 862.
The

first

Tenterton's

major

English

interpreting

Act arose in 1918 in the case of Banbury v.

Montreal,

[1918-19] E.R.

House

Lords

of

decision

Rep.

1; [1918] A.C. 626.

unanimously held that the

section

Lord
Bank of

There,

the

applied

to

fraudulent

misrepresentations but not to a

sentation.

The case involved a customer of the Bank of Montreal,

Banbury,
lend

who

asked

negligent

the Bank of Montreal if he might

the Westholme Lumber Co.

a large sum of money.

misrepre-

prudently
The

bank

advised Banbury that the loan would be prudent, and Banbury acted
upon the advice.
loan

Unfortunately,

was ill-advised),

loan.

Banbury

Montreal

sued

the advice was negligent

(the

and Banbury lost the entire part of
the

Bank of Montreal,

and the

defended on the grounds that the representation

his

Bank

of

as

to

the credit of Westholme Lumber Co. was barred by Lord Tenterton's
Act.
In the opinion of Lord Finlay,
an action of this nature does not fall within s. 6 of
Lord Tenterton's Act [referring to credit of a third
party] at all.
The action is for the breach of the
duty which it is alleged the bank had undertaken of
advising
the appellant [Banbury],
and not for
[fraudulent] misrepresentation. [1918-19] All E.R.
Rep. at p. 5; [1918] A.C. 639.

27

And

the

opinion of Lord Wrenbury is that Lord

Tenterton's

Act

does not apply to an innocent misrepresentation, for
The words of the section are, "to charge any person
upon or by reason of any representation," &c. The
words "charge any person upon any representation"
point, I think, plainly to an action for deceit. To
maintain such an action there must be fraud and there
must be damage. . . . Fraud is the cause of action.
If there existed a duty,
an action lies
for
negligence, and breach of duty, and in that action
the fact there was a misrepresentation, although
innocent, is material. . . . For these reasons I hold
that in this action, which is not an action for
fraud, but an action for negligence or breach of duy,
the appellants are right in their contention that
Lord Tenterton's Act does not apply. 1A. at 28.
In

fact,

the

Lords found that the bank did not

contractual duty to report to Banbury,
it undertook to advise Banbury,

not

any

but did have a duty, once

to act in a reasonable manner to

fulfill that assumed duty to Banbury.
that

have

Thus, the case establishes

negligent misrepresentations as to the credit of another do
fall with the scope of Lord Tenterton's statute because

the

statute was designed to prevent the use of a claim of fraud as
means

of

however,
in

circumventing

Frauds.

The

statute,

was not intended to apply to a cause of action grounded

negligence.

Therefore,

misrepresentation
action

the Statute of

a

if the defendant makes a

(as in this case),

the plaintiff's

lies in a claim for breach of duty,

negligent
cause

which is beyond

of
the

purview of the Statute of Frauds.
In

1967

the

decision in Banbury.
All E.R.,

English House of

Lords

reaffirmed

its

W.B. Anderson &Sons v. Rhodes, 862 [1967] 2

concerned a food brokerage company,
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Rhodes, which did

business

with

Taylor, Ltd,

a

newly formed brokerage house by

account

which

but failed to keep close track

soon came into

unaware of the account status,

default.

extended

of

Rhodes

of
was

and recommended Taylor to several

other brokerage firms as a good credit risk.
after,

name

Rhodes had some success with Taylor in the initial

stages of their relationship,
Taylor's

the

Very soon

there-

Taylor became insolvent and the brokerage firms which had
credit

to

Taylor on Rhodes' advice

sued

Rhodes

for

negligent misrepresentation.
The
handling

plaintiffs

argued

of the account,

Lord Tenterton's Act.

that Rhodes was

negligent

in

and Rhodes defended on the grounds

its
of

Rhodes asserted that it had given a repre-

sentation about the credit of a third person,

the representation

was not in writing, and therefore plaintiffs' claim was barred by
the Statute of Frauds, specifically Lord Tenterton's Act.
After citing from Banbury,
Court and reaffirmed Banbury.

supra, Lord Cairns spoke for the

He reasoned that:

An action for fraudulent misrepresentation as to
credit is an action on the representation and is
barred by Lord Tenterton's Act unless in writing.
An
action in respect of a negligent misrepresentation is
not an action on the representation and is an action
for the breach of a duty of care. . . . The conclusion
is that an action for breach of a duty of care in
making a representation is not barred by the Act of
1828. Id. at 865.
Thus,
and

Lord Cairn,

having examined the previous authorities

the legislative background of the case,

found

conclusively

that Lord Tenterton's Act does not apply to a negligent misrepresentation,

that

the

Act was enacted to halt avoidance
29

of

the

Statute of Frauds, and that in a negligent misrepresentation case
the
is

action is not an action on the misrepresentation itself
rather

an action on the actor's breach of its duty of

Therefore,

an act which seeks to end fraudulent written

but

care.

misrep-

resentations is inapplicable where the cause of action is founded
in negligence.
Public

policy

Tenterton's
Frauds,
ful

Act

also

supports the limited reading

given by the House of Lords.

give

reading.
many

Lord

Statute

of

which was designed to avoid fraud, can often be a power-

engine for promoting fraud.

erally

The

of

For this reason,

the Statute of Frauds

See,

e.g.,

a

courts

limited—even

gen-

grudging—

56 ALR 3d 1037 (discussing willingness of

courts to permit recovery in actions grounded on promissory

estoppel despite arguable application of the Statute of

Frauds.)

Where,

to

as

another
ized

a complainant does not seek

a writing (the principal rationale for the

Frauds),

but

of

statute

a

to

this case,
lee

this case,

to contractual duties that should normally be

in

breach

in

bank

rather

Statute

civic

of

for

its

permit

the

obligation.

In

a court should not

be raised as shield against

for example, there is little question that the appelmade

negligent representation regarding

worthiness of Amiron,

nor is there any

appellee

the

question that

relied on those representations to its damage.
stances,

memorial-

seeks to hold a defendant liable

duty of due care,

hold

credit-

appellant

In these circum-

should not be permitted to assert that a "gap
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filling" provision of the Statute of Frauds insulates it from its
obligation to conduct its business in the manner of a

reasonably

prudent banker.

CONCLUSION
Appellant
Judgment

respectfully requests the Court to set aside

the

of the lower court and to enter judgment for the appel-

lant based on the appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Respectfully submitted this 31st day of January, 1986.
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
TREE FKODUCTS COMPANY, an
Oregon corporation,

i

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs .
AMIRON DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
a Utah Corporation, et al.,
Civil No. 11,710

Defendants.
ECONOMY BUILDERS SUPPLY, INC., ]
a Utah Corporation, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

!

AMIRON DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ;
a Utah Corporation, et al.,
Defendants.

Civil No. 11,923

The above captioned ir.atter came before the Court pursuant to
Plaintiff, Tree Products Company's, Motion for Summary Judgment
and Defendant, Basin State Bank's, Motion for Surrjr.ary Judgment.
The issue before the Court was what duty, if any, was owed by
Basin Sict^ Bank to Tree Products Company, to inspect the project

and to supervise and manage the construction loan.
issues have been resolved

All other

either by rulings of the Court or

stipulation of the parties.
Counsel for Tree Products Company and Basin State Bank have
submitted Memoranda setting forth the undisputed facts and the
parties having agreed that the facts are undisputed

and that

pursuant thereto the Court should determine, as a matter of law,
the duty owed, if any, by Basin State Bank to the Plaintiff.

The

Court having reviewed the Memoranda, submitted by the parties,
having reviewed the documents in the file, having heard argument
by

counsel

and

having

taken

the matter

under

advisement and

entered its Ruling and being fully advised enters the following
conclusions :
1.

The

loan agreement

Amiron Development.

is between Basin

State Bank and

The funds were disbursed under the direction

of developer, Amiron.
2.

Basin State Bank, under the direction of Amiron, did

tender payment to Tree Products Company.

Due to a controversy

between Tree Products Company and Amiron, Tree Products Company
refused

payment.

Basin State Bank then, at the direction of

Amiron, disbursed the money to pay other bills of Amiron.
3.

The argument of Plaintiff, Tree Products Company, would

put Basin State Bank in a position of owing conflicting duties to
various parties and of owing duties not contemplated when it
entered

into

the

construction

loan.

The

araument

of

Tree

Products Company would require that Basin State Bank be in the
position

of

project

overseer

and

manager,

not

only

of

the

funding, but also of the actual construction of the project.
That is not a duty that was contemplated by Basin State Bank or
by

any

bank

when

it

enters

into

a

construction

funding

arrangement.
4.

Based

upon

the

findings

herein, and

the undisputed

facts the Court finds that no duty was owed by Basin State Bank
to Plaintiff, Tree Products Company, and that therefore, Basin
State Bank

is entitled, as a matter of law, to an Order of

Dismissal with prejudice on that issue.
Pursuant to the findings of the Court and the Court being
fully advised, the Court hereby grants Basin State Bank's Motion
for Summary Judgment and denies Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment and hereby;
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that the issue remaining before
the Court regarding the duty owed by Basin State Bank to Tree
Products Company is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this

day of February, 1985.
Richard C. Davidson
District Judge
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

TREE PRODUCTS COMPANY, an
Oregon Corporation,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)

vs.

RULING

)

AMIRON DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a Utah
corporation and BALES CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation,
et al
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)

ECONOMY BUILDERS SUPPLY, INC.,

)

et al,

)
Plaintiff,

vs.
AMIRON DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
et al,
Defendants.

Civil No. 11,710

)
)
)
)
)

Civil No. 11,923

This matter came before the Court pursuant to the motion
made by Plaintiff Tree Products Cocmpany alleging negligence on
the part of Defendant Basin State Bank.

The Court having heard

the argument and having taken the matter under advisement now
makes the following ruling.
Plaintiff Tree Products alleges that Basin State Bank had a
duty to inspect the project, to supervise and manage the loan and

that such duty was owed to Tree Products.

However, the facts in

this case show that the loan agreement was entered into between
Basin State Bank and Amiron Development.

Subsequently, the funds

were disbursed at the direction of Amiron.

While Tree Products

may have been an ultimate beneficiary of that agreement, no duty
exists on the part of the bank which is owed to them.

In

addition, in carrying out its duty to Amiron, Basin State did
tender payment to Tree Products but due to controversy with
Amiron, Tree Products refused payment.

At the direction of

Amiron, the money was utilized to pay other bills.
The argument of Plaintiff Tree Products would place the bank
in the position of owing conflicting duties and of owing duties
not contemplated in the making of the construction loan.

The

Bank would be set up in the position of project overseer and
manager not only of the construction funding but also of the
actual construction.

This is not such a duty as any bank would

contract for and is not what was done here.
Defendant Basin State Banks1 Motion for Summary Judgment
dated November 9, 1984 is hereby granted.
DATED this

/45

day of February, 19 85.
BY THE COURT:

cc:

Mark F. Robinson & David L. Glazier
Clark B. Allred
Joseph R. Fox
Bruce A. Maak
Robert A. Alderman
Kevin O'Connell
Kent T. Anderson
Joseph Rust

